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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY__________________________________________________ 
 
     
   Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) brings benefits to host countries' populations, using 
job creation, opportunities for education, training, and technology. The host country 
benefits from FDI inflows, improving its economy, introducing new technology, 
organizational and managerial skills that help domestic companies while improving its 
political institutions.            This author chose five countries of Latin America with 
different political systems and economic policies: Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba and 
Costa Rica. The goal of this thesis is to find out what kind of political systems and 
social environments in Latin America are best for attracting FDIs, and what are the 
obstacles those Latin American countries in non-democratic and authoritarian 
governments confront when trying to attract FDI. 
     This author researched data and multiple surveys with MNCs from public, private 
and non-governmental organizations.  The findings of this thesis show that despite the 
violence and criminality in these countries, Brazil and Mexico are the top ranked 
countries in attracting the most FDI inflows.  It was evident that MNCs prefer 
democratic governments, such as Brazil, Mexico and Costa Rica over authoritarian 
governments because the political and economic stability that democratic governments 
offer. Latin American countries with democratic institutions, free market regulations 
and an educated, technological trained work force are better prepared to attract FDI. 
MNCs avoided countries with socialist-authoritarian regimes, such as Cuba and 
Venezuela, for fear of expropriations, lack of contract enforcement or protection to the 
viii 
 
 
investor.  Latin American countries must be aware that raising their social and 
economic outcomes will help them to attract FDI inflows.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
      Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) brings benefits to host countries' populations, using 
job creation, opportunities for education, training, and technology. The host country 
benefits from FDI inflows, improving its economy, introducing new technology, 
organizational and managerial skills that help domestic companies while improving its 
political institutions. 
1,2
 MNCs promote competition among domestic companies, 
teaching better technological and managerial skills that are needed to compete with 
Transnational Companies (TNCs).
3
  FDI inflows benefit the host economy by making it 
more resilient to economic crisis, and adding a much needed source of funding in 
developing countries.
4
 Despite the global economic crisis, FDI inflows grew as much as 
40%, with respect to 2009, in Latin America and the Caribbean, a total of $113 billion.
5
  
Host government policies are improved allowing MNCs to have stable government 
regulations and a favorable environment for domestic companies and MNCs to grow and 
prosper together.
6
 
    While a stable political environment, fair regulations, infrastructure and the location of 
the host country are important factors when trying to attract FDI, human capital is, in the 
view of this author the most important asset of a host country. Human capital achieves 
two goals, enhanced productivity and steady economic growth (Lucas, R. 1988). 
7
 Human 
capital that can innovate and develop new technology is necessary for steady economic 
growth that benefits the host country in the long term.
8
 This author argues that relying 
only on natural resources and FDI inflows is a bad strategy when trying to create 
2 
 
 
economic independence.  Countries that have democratic governments and invest in 
education, training, and developing technologies have increased opportunities to attract 
FDI.
9
  MNCs that increase internal productivity and economic growth are vital to the 
host. MNCs also contribute to a better standard of life, social and political stability. 
10
 
I.I. Research Questions and Hypothesis 
I.II. The aim of the Research 
 
    The author of this work wants to underline the relationship between the type of 
political and economic system, human capital, social environment and the capacity of 
countries of Latin America to attract FDI and grow their economy while improving the 
standard of living of their citizens. 
I.III. Research questions 
                   This work answers the questions of what kind of political systems and social 
environments in Latin America are best for attracting FDIs, and what are the obstacles  
those Latin American countries in non-democratic and authoritarian  governments 
confront when trying to attract FDI. 
I.IV. Hypothesis 
   My intent here is to illustrate that a democratic, stable political environment and 
investment in human capital through education and technology are the most important 
factors that host countries have, not only to attract FDI, but also, to promote steady and 
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long term growth of their economy.  Countries with good political and judicial 
institutions and an educated work force are better prepared to attract FDI.  
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
       In Chapter III, through a literature review, the author intends to clarify what 
democracy is in Latin America, and how their emerging markets are growing in a 
globalized economy.  This study defines and briefly reviews the problem of the process 
of democratization and emerging markets (EMs) in Latin America. The author of this 
thesis gives examples of different countries in Latin America, showing the close 
relationship between political systems, social problems like poverty, corruption, social 
inequality and the way they affect FDI inflows. In this study the author defines terms like 
democracy, emerging markets, social and economic indicators that help us to study the 
political, economic and social reality of countries in Latin America.   
     This author chose five different countries of Latin America with different political 
systems and economic policies. Brazil, a democratic country  with free market policies, 
and great natural resources, oil and natural gas;
11
 Venezuela, a country that is passing 
from a consolidated democracy to a socialist authoritarian populist regime.  Like Brazil, 
Venezuela has a big territory and it is an oil producing country;
12
 Mexico, a medium size 
country that has not yet consolidated its democracy. It is also an oil producer;
13
 Cuba, a 
Caribbean island, with an authoritarian socialist regime, produces oil for its own 
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consumption and is beginning to open its economy;
14
 finally, Costa Rica, also a 
Caribbean country with a consolidated democracy, recipient of FDI in the technological 
manufacturing industry, agriculture, and ecotourism.
15
  
    To study the social economic and political systems of these countries, this work relies 
on public governmental sources and international organizations that have conducted 
research and surveys of MNCs working inside the countries studied. To better study 
economic, social or political statistics the author uses international organizations, public 
and governmental source data, as updated and accurate as possible.  Many countries of 
Latin America, have different time tables in reporting the statistical information of their 
countries, and in those cases, the author takes the most updated information available, 
even if the information is several years behind. 
   This author researched data and surveys of MNCs from private sources such as the 
2011 index of Economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street 
Journal, the Economist Intelligence unit, Economic Watch, World bank “Doing 
Business,” World Investment Report 2010, Transparency International, CIA World Fact 
Book, Boyden Report: Brazil, World Economic Forum, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, 
the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC or CEPAL in Spanish) and the 
United Nations Human Development index. Data from these private, public and non-
governmental organizations help us to find out the social and economic outcomes that 
MNCs are looking for when investing and consolidating their industries. The study also 
reviews other economic and social reports, academic peer review papers and newspapers 
on the subject.  
5 
 
 
    For the purposes of this study we estimated minimum wages per day (Table2) using 
the most updated data from official governmental sources, poverty rates (Table1) of 
selected countries and when needed more comparison we use other methodologies to 
measure poverty rates, such as the United Nations Human Development Index. The 
author selected the Latin American countries‟ Corruption Perceptions Index instead of 
the World Corruption Perceptions Index (Table3).  The author uses data from ECLAC for 
ranking FDI inflows (Table 4), Growth of Gross Domestic Product (Table 5) and 
Inflation trends of Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica and Venezuela (Tables 7-10). The inflation 
rate in Cuba is negligible (-0.5), since Cuba‟s government control prices and rations food. 
Thus, Cuba‟s inflation was not charted. The author also studies, the literacy rate, life 
expectancy, infant mortality rate, as part of the United Nations Human Development 
index of each of the five countries studied. The author studied social and health indicators 
and the United Nations Human Development Index, to estimate the human development 
of the countries studied.
16
  These are social indicators that many private and non-
governmental organizations use to advice MNCs for investing in a country and to help 
host countries to improve social and economic policies to attract FDI. 
         In Chapter IV, this author compiles the information on the different organizations 
studied showing the social, political and economic profile of each country.  The author 
analyses the results using the data of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Economic Watch, the 2011 Economic Freedom index, The Central 
Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Department of State, and Export and Development Canada 
(EDC), the author researched and compared total Growth of Gross Domestic Product 
(total growth of GDP), unemployment, GDP per Capita, GDP, and Real Urban minimum 
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wage (table 5), of the five countries studied, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela and 
Cuba. The author contrasted these countries economic growth and other global economic 
indicators (Table 6 and 7).  In Chapter IV, section VI, this author discusses the results of 
the organizations that conducted surveys with MNCs and draws her conclusions and 
recommendations for the Latin American countries studied.          
 
CHAPTER III 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
III.I. Democracy, Authoritarian Regimes, Political Institutions and FDI 
Inflows 
 
     A country is a political community, a political regime with a form of government 
(Huntington, 1996). In democratic societies there is a strong consensus among the people 
about the legitimacy of their particular political regime when well-built political 
institutions serve the public interest.
17
  Democracies are market oriented, supporting 
economic and political plurality while giving citizens freedoms by offering them a variety 
of choices, and interests. 
18,19
  
      Democracy, as a type of popular government, is defined in so many different ways, 
that David Collier and Steven Levitsky have called it, the "Democracy with adjectives."
20
 
The term democracy has been applied to other political systems, such as "social 
democracy," or "liberal democracy," “Christian democracy,” with federalism or without, 
with democratic politic institutions or not.  
7 
 
 
      To define a democratic political system has to gather the following conditions: firstly, 
a popular elected executive, with a popular elected parliament; Secondly, “universal 
suffrage and fair elections by secret ballot" (O'Kane, R. 2004); 
21
 and thirdly, the control 
of the military is in hands of civilians.  However in Latin America there is no clean cut 
democracy, neither gathers all the conditions stipulated for a democracy.  Many countries 
have retained the old non democratic political institutions and are burdened with a huge 
bureaucracy of their old socialist authoritarian regimes. They may have elections that are 
much disputed, and sometimes fraudulent, using clientelistic practices, stuffing the ballot 
box or manipulating the electoral registering list.  Many of these countries have 
candidates that once they attain the presidency, attempt changes to the constitution, 
centralizing the political institutions and work to stay in power like President Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela.   
    Authoritarian regimes in Latin America formed as a process of transition from 
colonization to military caudillos (militaries that were dictators themselves). Later, 
countries of Latin America were governed by oligarchies that repressed the population at 
large so as to monopolize the countries‟resources. 22  In the 1950‟s dictators controlled 
the military in Latin America, using it to prevent emancipation, socialist ideologies or 
separatist movements that threatened the interests of the oligarchy ( Lowly, M., Sader, 
E.1985) Examples of countries with past military regimes are Brazil, Argentina, Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Dominican Republic,  Bolivia, Venezuela, 
Paraguay, Panama, Uruguay, among others. 
23
 The waves of militarization and 
demilitarization marked different transitions in Latin America.  For example, a military 
official, President Juan Domingo Perón, after ascending to a first term to the presidency 
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of Argentina (1946-1952), was legally re-elected in 1951 as president and later deposed 
by a military regime in 1955.
24
 
    Influenced by the cultural relativism of the 1970‟s, and the emergence of the new 
world order, the economic and social modernization of Latin America gave place to a 
pluralistic more integrated society. With the liberalization of the economy the power 
remained in the hands of dictators, or as in Mexico, the official party, the Revolutionary 
Institutional Party, (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI) which governed Mexico 
for seven decades with different presidents, but always with the same authoritarian, 
centralized government.
25
  
   In the 1980‟s many Latin American countries such as Mexico, and Argentina began the 
liberalization of their economies while trying to holding on to old political institutions 
and authoritarian regimes. Living between authoritarian political regimes and neoliberal 
economic policies kept them detached from full-fledged democratic institutions, and 
challenged the preconditions for a democracy (Lyn, Karl T., 1990).
26
  
    These military regimes had military leaders as presidents, but the regimes were really a 
hybrid form of dictatorship and free market policies. This was the case of Chilean 
President Augusto Pinochet during the 1970‟s and continuing through the1990‟s. These 
military dictatorships did not propose to create a new state, or to hold a specific ideology. 
In the case of Chile, it was the protection that Pinochet offered against the socialist 
agenda of President Salvador Allende. Thus, the United States tacit support for Pinochet 
during the Cold War era. 
27
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   The memories of relatives and grandparents compel Latin Americans to reject, 
vehemently, the return of authoritarian regimes, the military dictatorships and ruling 
parties of the 1970‟s. However, it is evident for many people, that abuses of human 
rights, inequalities and economic disparities are driving the growing support of the PRI in 
Mexico, an implicit rejection to the Partido Acción Nacional in Mexico (National Action 
Party or PAN), the party of incumbent President Calderón.
28
  
     According to a study of the Center for the Americas at Vanderbilt University called 
“Latin American Public Opinion Project,” 75% of Latin Americans believe in democracy 
in normative terms such as freedom, liberty of expression, movement and choice. They 
think that democracy is equivalent to human rights, equality, “the power of the people,” 
(Seligson, 2008)
29
  
    Many Latin Americans are weary of the term democracy because repeatedly, in 
different Latin American countries elected presidents have abused their power, eroding 
the foundations of their political institutions and citizens‟ fundamental freedoms. 30 In 
other instances, citizens of Latin American countries have witnessed the coup d'état of 
their elected president by a military leader, cancelling all human rights and freedoms. An 
example of this is the attack by the armed forces, under the leadership of General 
Augusto Pinochet, in September 11, 1973 of La Moneda Palace, offices of the 
democratically elected President Salvador Allende, a socialist. 
31
 
  Chile had a history of democratic governments lasting for 130 years until Pinochet‟s 
coup d‟ état.32 Pinochet‟s military attack culminated with the death of President Allende, 
and a dictatorship that lasted until 1990, when the transition towards democracy started.  
Under Pinochet, citizens lived in a police state. Pinochet‟s regime was plagued with 
10 
 
 
massive violations of human rights and more than five thousand people dead,
33
 many of 
whom were never found. Yet, the Pinochet regime did liberalize the economy
34
 in order 
to attract FDI.  His neoliberal free market policies and his fight against communism in his 
country during the Cold War era helped him to obtain some legitimacy to his regime and 
attract FDI inflows, despite flagrant violations of human rights. 
35
  
     The United States provided economic and military aid to Pinochet‟s regime.36 In the 
Post Cold war era, in an increasingly globalized world, dissidents were outspoken about 
human rights violations, torture and the assassination of thousands of dissidents and 
victims. President James “Jimmy” Carter began to distance the U. S. from this brutal 
regime.  The U.S. voted against Export- Import Bank loans and condemned Chile‟s 
violations of human rights in the United Nations. After Carter, the U.S. continued its 
policy of refusing to help his regime, and this sustained pressure eventually forced 
Pinochet to step down, opening Chile to democracy without damaging Chile‟s economic 
gains.
37
 
     Many Latin Americans are suspicious of the term democracy and the political process 
to achieve democracy.
38
 For many, the term democracy implies a first- world countries 
intervention and the exploitation of Latin American natural resources.
39
 They zealously 
protect the sovereignty of their countries. 
40
 Many cherish the dream of having a country 
where there is no poverty, with free education, health and equality. 
41
They want to avoid 
the exploitation and colonization of past times. 
42
 In their view, socialist systems uphold 
those ideals. However, there is a dominant tendency to authoritarianism and paternalism, 
with a constitutional government (Foweraker, J. 2003).
43
 There is a great divide in many 
11 
 
 
countries of Latin America between democracy and authoritarian regimes that uphold 
socialist ideals.
44
    
      In some countries of Latin America, the appearance of the government would be that 
of a democratic country, but in reality, it is that of an authoritarian government. 
45
 Even 
when Latin American countries have republican and constitutional governments, more or 
less democratic elections, some of these Latin American countries retain authoritarian 
governments with centralized political institutions and little political freedoms or human 
rights.  Furthermore, political conflict in Latin American countries is also the result of the 
divide between conservatives and liberals.  Through the nineteenth century and still 
today, conservatives have supported the union of state and Church, economic 
protectionism, monopolies and oligarchies, while the liberals pressed for separation of 
Church and state, a secular state, and open economies to international trade.
46
  
     The political systems of Latin America can hardly be compared to those of the United 
States or European countries. Modern nation-states, as is the case of Latin America 
countries, have confronted three central problems: Firstly, one central authority figure 
that unites the population despite external pressures and internal divisions; secondly, the  
growth of state‟s authority in response to mass politics,  and thirdly, the state‟s reforms as 
a consequence of international and domestic politics (Foweraker J.  2003)
47
  
     Born from colonialism, most Latin American countries experienced the caudillo 
government, the leaders that opposed foreign monarchies with the hope that they could 
unite the children of colonizers, uncivilized populations, tribes and rebel factions.
48
 Thus, 
most Latin American countries have opposed monarchies and preferred constitutional 
governments and a republic form of government to claim their own sovereignty.
49
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        However, constitutionalism does not necessarily support the idea in Latin America 
of a liberal democracy. 
50
Instead, some political actors choose populism and authoritarian 
governments in order to win their elections, and stay in power. Populism, a political 
ideology used in Europe in the nineteenth century to support peasant communal claims 
against western liberalism and corporations is a resource frequently sought in Latin 
America. 
51
The populist government programs were born from the need to unite and 
organize populations, and to garner support for the leader in power. 
52
 
    President Felipe Calderón highlighted the split between authoritarian and democratic 
political systems, when in the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland Calderón 
said that Latin America is divided between countries turning to the past authoritarian or 
control system, and other countries of Latin America seeking democracy and free market 
to attract FDI inflows for economic growth:
 53
 
“Many countries in Latin America have chosen to move towards the past and among their most harmful 
decisions are seeking nationalizations, expropriations, state control of the economy and authoritarianism; 
Mexicans have decided to look to the future and to strengthen democracy, markets and investment. Latin 
America nations must choose a path of democracy and free markets or risk falling behind competitors in 
the rest of the world,” Calderon said; “Several countries in Latin America are acting against foreign 
investors, but we are thinking all the day, every day, how can we attract more investment to 
Mexico”(Mexican President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa. Davos, Switzerland, 2007).”54 
 
  Some Latin American presidents while advocating socialist ideals are centrists, 
respecting MNCs and free market.  This is the case of former Brazil President Luiz Inácio 
“Lula”da Silva, a leftist President of the Workers‟ party.  Lula da Silva consolidated 
Brazil‟s free market but also implemented social programs to promote equality, giving 
money to the poor, subsidized housing loans, and raising the minimum wage.
55
 
     In contrast, Bolivian President Evo Morales, a committed socialist with an ideology 
based on traditional Andean values and social organization, decided to seize more 
13 
 
 
government control of natural gas and other natural resources, reforming the constitution, 
and promising to increase the state‟s control of the economy.56  
     Presidents in Cuba and Venezuela frequently give discourses on the gains of the 
revolution. The rhetoric of these Presidents in Latin America is designed to attract voters. 
It is a socialist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric. 
57
 This is an excerpt of the 
speech of President of Venezuela Hugo Chávez Frías to the United Nations. 
   “The speech of the world “tyrant” President, (referring to President George W. Bush) cynic, full of 
hypocrisy. It is the imperial hypocrisy, the intent of controlling everything, they want to impose us the 
democratic model, democratic as they conceived it, the false democracy of the elites, and besides a very 
original democratic model imposed by bombs, by invasions, at gun point! What a Democracy! We should 
review the Aristotle‟s thesis and the first ones (philosophers), who talked somewhere in Greece of 
democracy, to see what kind of democracy is the one that is imposed through the marines, the invasions, 
the aggressions and the bombs” (Hugo Chavez, September 20, 2006).58 
 
   Democratic Latin American countries, do not escape claims of electoral fraud, 
clientelism, and corruption.  During the 1980's and 1990s in Mexico, scholars, observers, 
and journalists, claimed that the administration of elections was fraudulent.
59
 Mexico has 
had a reputation for decades of clientelism, stuffing the ballot box, giving food boxes in 
exchange of votes, and fraudulent vote registers.
60
 As of today, President Felipe 
Calderón's election in 2006 is still refuted. Some scholars argue that he was legally 
chosen as president and he won by a small margin.
61
 Manuel Lopez Obrador, the 
opposition leading candidate in 2006, and his sympathizers contested the election, 
arguing that there was fraud. Obrador called for street protest rallies and occupation of 
public plazas. Obrador contested the results claiming that there were many irregularities 
demanding recount of all the votes. The population wanted a recount of all the votes, but 
the electoral tribunal just recounted 9% of the votes, casting a shadow of distrust in the 
population. 
62
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    President Calderón declared himself president in his headquarters with the electoral 
tribunal eventually giving the victory to Calderón. A big sector of the population still 
thinks that his claim to the presidency is illegitimate. The lack of transparency in 
recounting all the votes, the illegal campaigning of former President Vicente Fox in favor 
of Calderón, and ads paid for by businesses organizations, a practice illegal in Mexico, 
rested legitimacy and popular power to the presidency of Felipe Calderón. 
63
  
         Another example is Brazil. When Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva from the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (Workers‟ Party or PT) became president of Brazil in 2002 , with strong 
popular support, the ideals of ethics, political transparency,  and redistribution, that he 
and his party had held  for more than two decades, appeared to have come finally to 
fruition. Nothing could have been farther from the truth.  Lula, as he is popularly known, 
took office in 2003, and two years later, in June 2005, Roberto Jefferson, a house 
representative, denounced how the PT‟s high ranking members had regularly bribed 
members of the congress, the government coalition and “illegal off the books donations 
for campaigns”( Goldfrank, B. Wampler, B).64 It was also found that they were using 
illicit public funds and contracts to get those donations.  
    Buying votes was not new. It was a practice seen before in Brazil, especially in the 
reelection of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. 
65
 What Brazil's citizens found the 
most disappointing was that the workers‟ party had denounced unethical electoral 
practices and corruption for two decades. Yet, the PT was found responsible of the same 
bad behaviors they denounced so fervently in past administrations.
66
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III.II. Latin America Emerging Markets 
 
   Emerging markets (EMs) are those situated in developing countries whose "income 
levels, GPD per capita, human development indices, market institutions, technological 
sophistication and production efficiencies have not reached the standards of a developed 
country" (Veliyath, R., Brouthers, L. 2010).
67
 Grzegorz Kolodko
68
 argues that an 
emerging market does not have mature institutional systems or a well delineated market 
development path like those of highly developed market economies.  In general, EMs 
have rapid rates of economic growth and development, substantial domestic demand 
bases, the ability to absorb and assimilate technology, large human capital bases, and 
institutions that have the capacity to support market and economic expansion, (Veliyath, 
R, Brouthers, L. 2010).
69
  Latin American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Chile, 
Argentina, and Costa Rica are making economic reforms, to attract FDI, to their 
emerging markets. 
    At the start of 1980‟s there were 32 EMs, with a worth of US$70bn, 2.5% of the world 
market capitalization, (ECLAC, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Brief Paper, 2010).
70
  Despite the financial crisis of 2009, in 2010 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries attracted US$ 112.634 billion,  receiving 40% more of 
FDI than in 2009 (US$80.376).
71
  
     Natural resources, and domestic demand for services in countries of Latin America 
(especially in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) drives the increase of FDI 
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inflows (table 4),
 72
  not only from MNCs, but also from Transnational Latin American 
Corporations.
73
  
    In addition, MNCs look at certain social and economic indicators that allow them to 
take their financial decisions. MNCs calculate the financial risk to invest in the host 
country.  Financial risk is defined as “the exposure to adverse events that erode 
profitability and in extreme circumstances bring about business collapse” (Chapman, J.R. 
16.1)
74
 The financial risk is assessed by MNCs by the activity of the host market‟s 
country, the price risks, currency risks, inflation, and contraction of the economy, as well 
as its growth, recessions or recovery (business cycle).
75
  
       However, the political risk is equally important for MNCs when making a decision 
of where to invest and how much to invest. MNCs look at how easy or difficult is to start 
a business and to thrive in the host country. They look to the “easy to do business rank” 
that measures the time it takes to start a business, dealing with construction permits, 
registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across the 
borders, enforcing contracts, and how easy or difficult is to close a business (The World 
Bank, 2011).
76
   
     Weston and Sorge‟s definition of political risks as “actions of national governments 
which interfere with or prevent business transactions, or change the terms of agreements, 
or cause the confiscation of wholly or partially foreign owned business property” (As 
cited by Kobrin, S. 1979),
77
 MNCs fear social and political instability. The fear of MNCs 
is that their assets be taken, whether by expropriation or regulatory measures (indirect 
expropriation).
78
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
   The results and analysis of each country, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela and 
Cuba, is a compilation of data and surveys of MNCs from private, public and non-
governmental, sources such as the 2011 index of Economic Freedom of the Heritage 
Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, the Economist Intelligence unit, Economic 
Watch, World bank “Doing Business,” World Investment Report 2010, Transparency 
International, International Monetary Fund,  CIA World Fact Book, Boyden Report: 
Brazil, World Economic Forum, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLAC or CEPAL in Spanish) and the United Nations 
Human Development index. This author‟s intention is to show the economic, political 
and social profile of each country studied as related to the FDI inflows that MNCs are 
looking for when investing and consolidating their industries. The study also reviews 
other economic and social reports, academic peer review papers and newspapers on the 
subject.  
 
 
IV.I. BRAZIL 
IV.I.I. Brazil Natural Resources 
     Brazil, a democratic country, is one of the richest countries in the world in natural 
resources, agriculture (6% of the GPD), mining, manufacturing and service sectors.
79
 It is 
a country rich in natural gas and oil. During the past decade, Brazil has been increasing 
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its production of oil and ethanol.  PETROBRAS,
80
 the oil, gas, and energy industry of 
Brazil is a publicly traded oil company, but with the Government of Brazil as principal 
stockholder. 
81
 
    PETROBRAS is ranked second in reserves,
82
  after Venezuela, with around 14 billion 
barrels of proven oil reserves and is the third largest energy corporation in the world.
 83
  
Brazil's rank in world oil reserves may change with the new discoveries of oil and gas in 
Brazil's pre-salt basins offshore of Brazil.  There is a great possibility, according to the 
specialists, that oil in deep waters is yet to be discovered.
84 
Thus, Brazil will, in the years 
to come, become a leading petroleum exporter.  
       In 2010, PETROBRAS produced 2.6 million barrels per day. This oil company has 
16 refineries, 130, 200 thousand square kilometers of exploration area, 132 platforms, 
and 15,000 producing wells.
 85
 Brazil is leader in South America in science and 
technology for the exploitation of agriculture, biofuels, deep-sea oil production, and 
research on remote sensing (U.S. Department of State).
 86
    
    Moreover, the finding of an enormous natural gas field, Jupiter, off Rio de Janeiro's 
coastline, will help Brazil become independent in natural gas.  At present time, Brazil 
buys this natural resource from Bolivia.
 87
  Furthermore, Brazil has great natural gas 
reserves in the Santos Basins, Campos, Espíritu Santo, and in other territories of Brazil in 
need of improving transportation. In the near future natural gas can become a substitute 
for the industrial sector, gaining domestic demand due to its lower price.
88
 However, 
specialists argue that Brazil needs to be cautious on the profitability estimation of the new 
oil and gas fields. Reserves, like the one in Tupi, are located in a subsalt zone 
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approximately 18,000 feet below the ocean surface, areas of technical difficulty for the 
extraction and exploitation of the reserves (Energy Information Administration).
 89
   
     Private companies such as BG group and Petrogral, a consortium of Petrobras, have 
contributed to the exploration and findings of oil and natural gas reserves such as the 
Tupi field in 2007. The Government of Brazil maintains control of the biggest oil and 
Gas Company in Brazil, PETROBRAS. However, MNCs, such as  Shell's project of 
Parque de Conchas and the Frade project operated by Chevron, produced as much as 
100,000bbl/d and  68,000 bbl/d, respectively (Energy Information Administration, 
2011).
90
  
  Brazil exports (7.0.2% growth) have decreased when compared with 2010 (29.2%). The 
country exports transport, equipment, minerals (iron, ore, phosphates, manganese, 
uranium, copper, coal platinum). Agricultural products such as soybeans, maize, coffee, 
sisal, and tobacco are key exports for Brazil. This country also exports footwear and 
autos (The World Bank).
91
  
 
IV.I.II Brazil Economy 
     As of June 2011, Brazil‟s economy is booming and growing. Brazil, a country with 
great human, natural and agricultural capital, is now attracting more new investors and 
MNCs than ever, all looking to profit from the natural resources, economic prosperity 
and a strong currency.
 92
With a GDP of $2.0 trillion, GDP per capita $10,514 (Tables 5 
and 6), a control inflation of 4.9-6% (See table 7), and FDI inflows of 25.9 billion,
93
 
Brazil‟s economy is expanding at an incredible rate (economic growth around 4.5%).94 
Brazil is now the largest economy in South America. 
95
 Brazil‟s economy is stable and 
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growing steadily.
96
 This country attracted the most FDI inflows in South America (87%). 
When compared with other regions of Latin America, Brazil and Mexico have attracted 
the most High-Tech jobs (ECLAC FDI Brief Paper 2010).  Brazil attracted as much as 
US$48.4 billion to its economy through FDI inflows (TABLE 4. Source: ECLAC 2010).  
Brazil exported $202 billion while importing $182 billion in 2010.  Demand is growing 
in telecommunications, banking, commerce, computing, internet services, and energy 
(66% of GDP).
97
 Tourism is a very important source of revenue.
98
  Even when Brazil had 
a trade surplus of $20.3 billion, the public debt of this country is 60% of the GDP,
99
and 
the external debt is $310,800 billion.
100
 Unemployment was 7, 8% and an inflation of 
7.8%.        
        Six  of Brazil‟s corporations are on the ten top list of the largest corporations: 
Petrobras, the first largest corporation in the field  of Petroleum and Energy; The second 
largest is BR Distribuidora , a fuel wholesale corporation; Telemar, a telecommunications 
corporation is the third largest corporation in Brazil;  Ambev, a beer and drinks company 
is the fifth largest corporation; Ipiranga, a fuel wholesale company is the sixth largest 
corporation; Brazil Telecom, a telecommunications company is the tenth largest 
corporation in Brazil. MNCs in the list of the top largest corporations are: Telefonica, a 
Spanish telecommunications corporation ranked the fourth largest corporation; 
Volkswagen, an automobile German company is the seventh largest corporation in 
Brazil; Shell, a UK/Holland fuel wholesale corporation is the eighth largest corporation 
in Brazil, and General Motors, an American automobiles corporation is the ninth largest 
corporation in Brazil.
101
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    Most specialists believe that Brazil is in a period of swelling economic activity. The 
reasons are threefold: First, the country has great natural resources and is, after the United 
States and Canada, the third largest consumer of energy.
 102
 Secondly, deep economic and 
social policies resulted in a strong currency and thirdly, an increasing number of young 
educated workers.
103
 Moreover, Brazil has implemented social reforms, concentrating a 
great portion of public expenditures on three basic, but vital areas: education, health, and 
the creation of infrastructure (Vilmar E. Faria, 2002).
104
  
 
    
IV.I.III. Brazil Human Capital 
    Brazil‟s multiethnic population lives mainly in the South Central area of the country, 
the industrial areas of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte.  Brazil‟s population 
is 191.5 million, the largest in Latin America, and fifth in the world. This is a society 
with a majority of young people, young adults and middle aged people, as is typical with 
most of Latin America‟s population.  This workforce is a growing sector of Economical 
Active Population, (EAP) between the ages of 15 and 64 they account for 67% of the 
population.
 105
  In the 1980's, the EAP increased by 25% as a result of the incorporation 
of women into the work force. Women have discovered, over the past thirty years, greater 
incentives and advantages to working and pursuing an education. 
106
  
     The minimum wage per day is $10.89 (Table. 2).  Brazilians have a life expectancy at 
birth of 68.97 for males and 76.27 for females years (as 2011), with a literacy rate of 88% 
and unemployment rate of 7%. However, Brazil still has great problems with poverty that 
affects many of the people.  Thirty percent of the population is poor (Table 1), and the 
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infant mortality rate is high, (21.17 deaths/ 1000 live births).  While education is free, the 
poorest parts of the country receive a lower standard of education, perpetuating inequality 
and poverty.
107
 The Human development (HDI) index (Composite indices, 2011) of 
Brazil has a value of 0.699, below the HDI of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(0.706).
108
  
 
 
 
IV.I.IV ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
  
    The World Bank “Doing Business”109ranks Brazil in 127th place out of 183 economies, 
(Brazil ranked124
th
 in 2010). 
110
 Brazil‟s democratic government and free market policies 
and regulations, permit the conditions for MNCs to find a variety of enterprises in 
services, oil and natural gas, minerals, and telecommunications.  Yet, Brazil faces 
obstacles in attracting FDI such as a deficient infrastructure, inefficient bureaucracy, 
corruption, and the inability to trade across borders. 
111
These factors play a role in 
holding back Brazil‟s economic growth, although infrastructure has doubled, Brazil still 
needs more FDI in infrastructure to keep the country‟s economic growth on its current 
upward path (MIGA, World Bank Group).
112
 The World Bank‟s “Doing Business Rank,” 
found that Brazilian administrative procedures take too long: 128 days to open a business, 
dealing with construction permits, 112 days,  registering property  122 days, and closing 
a business 132 days. Doing business across borders and paying taxes are the most 
complicated problems that MNCs face in Brazil.   
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  The political climate is difficult and represents a hurdle to create efficient, on time free 
market policies. The political environment reflects the struggles of the right and left, the 
congressional political ideologies in the nation, slowing the passage of important fiscal 
reforms.  Moreover, the state is heavily bureaucratic, with high levels of corruption 
(graded 3.7 CPI. Table 3) and the judicial system is painfully slow.
113
 . 
Despite the political, judicial environment and ongoing corruption, the economy of Brazil 
is prosperous. This is the result of economic and social policies carried out by President 
Cardoso and then continued by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
 114
 Even though Lula 
da Silva was considered a leftist president, he adopted a centrist position, advocating for 
the free market policies of President Cardoso and advancing the liberalization of the 
economy. Thus, Lula da Silva put his face on the economic bonanza and the aggressive 
privatization reform initiated by President Cardoso.   Advocating for the poor, while 
forwarding the free market, Lula da Silva sustained himself as a very popular president.  
During the 2009 global economic crisis, Brazil‟s economy experienced not only stability, 
but modest growth.
 115
  Lula da Silva‟s approach of respect to foreign investments and 
contractual obligations, helped to attract private capital. It is expected that the incumbent 
president Dilma Rousseff will follow the same free market policies of Lula da Silva. 
      Social problems that Brazil has to confront are violence due to crime and insecurity 
(EDC Economics Brazil, 2010). 
116
Personal security and violence are a concern that may 
deter FDI inflows. 25% of the populations live under the poverty line, and there is high 
criminality in important cities of Brazil.
117
 Inequality expresses itself in discrimination 
and income disparities that divide this great country. The cash transfer programs of Lula 
da Silva, “Bolsa de Familia, resulted in social mobility to the middle class, giving hope to 
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30 million Brazilians. Infant mortality decreased bellow 23 deaths per 1,000 live births 
(21.17). 
118
 
Not only does Brazil need to attract FDIs to improve its economy, but also, it needs FDI 
inflows to obtain revenues for the gigantic security needs, combating drug trafficking, 
crime, homicide, and the increasing demand of social programs, especially in the areas of 
health and education. There is an increasing need to attract more FDI inflows, knowing 
that these inflows increase productivity, innovation and technology.  
      
 
IV.II MEXICO 
 
IV.II.I Mexico Natural Resources 
 
     Mexico, a democratic country, obtains a third of its budget revenue from Petroleos de 
Mexico (PEMEX), a government controlled oil and Gas Company with operations 
mainly in the east coast of Mexico. In 2008, the government of President Felipe Calderon 
tried to privatize the state oil monopoly, having massive protests from Mexican 
population who see oil exploration and exploitation as a national patrimony.
119
 
    The Mexican constitution (Article 27) keeps oil exploitation, exploration and sale of 
gasoline on the hands of the Government of Mexico. In 2009, Mexico‟s production of oil 
ranked seventh in the world and was the second largest oil provider to the United States. 
Mexico‟s production of oil has steadily declined, losing a quarter of its output capacity. 
The lack of modernization, investment, exploration of new oil fields, and the aging of 
existing fields, has taken its toll on a country that depends heavily on oil revenues. Oil 
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funds account for around a third of the governmental budget
120
, helping to pay for 
Mexico‟s increasingly expensive social programs. PEMEX needs exploration and 
refineries if Mexico wants to remain competitive abroad and supply its domestic demand.  
Pemex has subcontracted services to private companies. After seven decades, Pemex has 
not explored more than 20% of the Mexican territory.  While the U.S. has 149 oil 
refineries, Mexico has only six.
121
 
    Thus, Mexico has passed regulations permitting private partnerships, with the 
government keeping control of the company operations.
122
 In March, of 2011, Mexico 
had its first auction of oil field operating contracts that will give the right to private 
companies to reactivate and operate three small fields. This will bring revenues, 
expertise, and exploration to the oil fields of Mexico.  
123
 Other Mexican natural 
resources include silver, gold, copper, lead, zinc and timber. 
 
IV.II.II. Mexico Economy 
 
   Mexico‟s economy is the 13th largest economy, in nominal terms, with a GDP of $1.5 
trillion.  It is the 11
th
, largest purchasing power parity country (PPP, $ 1,563 trillion in 
2009).
124
 Mexico has a GDP real growth rate (in 2010) of 5.5%, and a 5-year compound 
annual growth of O.7% 5- year (Table 5 and 6). GDP per capita is $13,900 (as 2010).  
Services contributed 62.5% to the GDP, 33% Industry, and 4.2% agriculture. 
Unemployment is 5.5%, a control inflation of 5.3% (Table 8).
125
 Minimum wage is very 
low, 5.01 per day, comparable to Haiti (2011). Mexico‟s exports to U.S. were $234.8 
billion in 2008, falling to 184.9 billion in 2009 (Economic Watch). Mexico imported 
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$306billion (2010 est.)
126
 Mexico‟s ten top ranking corporations are: Pemex in first place, 
the state oil company; America Mobil, a Mexican telecommunications company is the 
second top ranked corporation; Walmart de Mexico from the U.S. This giant retail 
company is the third top ranked corporation; Comisión Federal de Electricidad, a 
Mexican Energy company is the fourth top ranked corporation; Cemex, the Mexican 
construction company is the fifth top ranked corporation; Grupo Alfa, a Mexican 
conglomerate is the sixth top ranked corporation; BBVA Bancomer, a Spanish financial 
corporation is the ninth top ranked corporation; and Ford Motor Company, an automobile 
corporation is the tenth top ranked corporation (CNN, Expansion 2011).
127
  
    Mexico received money (remittances) from illegal immigrants in the U.S. in the 
amount of $25 billion in 2008.  It is the largest source of foreign exchange in the Mexican 
economy.
128
 The total exports were affected by the American economic crisis and fell 
from US $ 234 billion in 2008 to $ 184 billion in 2009.  Mexico imports were $234 
billion.  Mexico is the greatest importer in Latin America.
129
 Mexico external debt is 
212,500 billion.
130
  The public debt of Mexico is 41.5% of the GDP.
131
 
 
IV.II.III Mexico Human Capital 
     Mexico‟s population is 107.6 million. Poverty in Mexico is between 30 and 40% of 
the population, there are 18.2% of people below the poverty line, and the minimum wage 
is inadequate to sustain the population ($ 5.1 per day). Its acquisitive value for basic 
foods is completely eroded (Tables 1 and 2). Based on food-based definition of poverty 
by asset, poverty is 47%. The infantile mortality rate in Mexico is 17.29 deaths/ 1000 live 
births. The Life expectancy at birth in males was 73.65 years. Life expectancy in women 
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was 79.43 years.
132
 The literacy rate is 86.1% Mexico has a Human Development Index 
(Composite Indices 2010) of 0.750, above the region level.  Homicide rate was 
11.6/100,000 people (2010). There were 40,000 deaths attributed to the war on drugs 
during the past four years and a half.
133
 Moreover, Mexico is a country with widespread 
corruption (graded 3.1 CPI, Table 3).  
 
 
IV.II.IV. ANALYSIS OF MEXICO’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
     Mexico is the second country, after Brazil that has attracted more FDI inflows. The 
reasons are threefold.  Firstly, the liberalization of the economy since the 1980‟s, giving 
guarantees to MNCs of the continuance of the country‟s free market policies and process 
of democratization. 
134
 The World Bank “Doing Business” ranks Mexico in the 35th place 
out of 183 economies.  Despite the violence and corruption in the country, the steady free 
market policies, democratic government, and friendly regulations have attracted FDI 
inflows estimated at $17.2 billion. Certainly, the GDP and the loss of jobs have been 
affected by the rampant violence caused by the war on drugs instituted by Calderon‟s 
government. 
135
Yet the study shows how consolidating the free market, and advancing 
the democratization process, makes a difference in how a country attracts FDI inflows. 
   Secondly, Mexico also has attracted FDI inflows because of its strategic location. This 
has been of paramount importance.  The ease of transporting and trading across borders 
thanks to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in January 1994 
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between Canada, Mexico and the United States, had an impact in attracting FDI inflows. 
136
 
    Thirdly, Mexico has kept the labor force inexpensive to attract FDI inflows. We can 
see how Mexico has kept the minimum wage very low (5.01 per day, table 2), compared 
to Brazil (10.77) and Costa Rica (15.94). Mexico has a cheap labor force similar to that 
of Haiti and Nicaragua helping this country to attract FDI. However, poverty and 
violence are rampant in Mexico.  
   President Felipe Calderon‟s war on drugs has cost jobs in major Industrial cities such as 
Ciudad Juarez. This city lost almost $450 million dollars in investments. 
137
 Despite the 
social unrest in Mexico, President Calderon was able to pass judicial, social security and 
tax reforms necessary to forward the liberalization of the economy. The World Bank 
“Doing Business,” ranks Mexico 35 of 183 economies. According to “Doing business,” 
the problems that are experienced in Mexico when looking to invest are registering a 
property, paying taxes, and protecting investors.
138
 
    President Felipe Calderon‟ social programs as those of former presidents have targeted 
poverty, education, health and medicines. Yet, these programs have been inefficient, and 
inequality has been increasing, despite the great investment of the Mexican government.  
For example, the budget for education in Mexico is 22% of public non-capital spending. 
139
 
     Even when the education budget is excellent, the very powerful teachers‟ union in 
Mexico takes 80% of non-capital education spending in salaries leaving a very small 
budget to take care of the needs of each individual student and school infrastructure.
140
  
There is corruption in the pay rolls, teachers who do not exist, or are dead, imaginary 
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names, and some teachers have left their positions to relatives after retiring. 
141
The Union 
is the biggest in Latin America with 1.2 million members. However, the leader of the 
union, Elba Esther Gordillo backed up Calderon‟s close victory.  When Calderon 
announced competency tests for teachers, the union responded with strikes. 
142
President 
Calderon insisted in reforming the education system despite the union, giving tax breaks 
for tuitions at private schools.
143
 Mexico is ill equipped to attract more technological 
manufacturing MNCs because technological training and schooling is substandard. 
     Furthermore, the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (The Secretary of Social 
Development, Sedesol) is reviewing as many as 19 large, costly social programs. 
According to United Nations Human Development, poverty increased 5%, the equivalent 
of 6 million people in 2009 despite all the social programs. 
144
  
    According to Transparency International in Mexico, the problem of corruption is 
getting worse. This agency has found that the cost of bribes for middle income families 
was as much as 14% of their income and for those earning minimum wage, 33% of their 
income. 200 million acts of corruption were identified when Mexican families needed to 
use public services provided by federal authorities or government employees.
145
  
  However, Mexico has the most pressing problems of productivity, and failed social and 
economic policies of the three democratic countries studied. This country is the greatest 
importer of all countries of Latin America with $334 billion, exporting $230 billion; its 
public debt is 40% with a huge external debt of $212,500 billion. Mexico‟s economy 
depends heavily on the economy of the U.S.  The country needs to attract FDI inflows to 
be solvent. 
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    Mexico‟s declining reserves of oil, falling remittances from the United States, 
institutional and judicial corruption, drug violence have combined to lower the GDP by 
1.2 percentage points.  A high poverty rate (30-40%), and very low minimum wage are 
good predictors that political and social instability will continue affecting the economy 
and all Mexicans‟ standard of living.  Thus, Mexico will be forced to invest more in 
security and social programs. This is money Mexico does not have.  
    Mexico needs to improve the standards of education. It needs bilingual training 
beginning in elementary school. Mexico needs quality technical training to attract 
technological manufacturing corporations. The social and economic indicators help us to 
see that there is great economic disparity and inequality in the Mexican population. In 
Mexico, 30-40 % of the population controls the wealth of the country, while the majority 
lives in poverty or migrates to the United States. 10% of Mexico‟s population (10 million 
people) lives in the United States.  Social and economic inequality is unacceptable for a 
country with a GDP of 1.5 trillion. Without reforms, Mexico runs the risk of creating 
more violence, uprisings and poverty that will affect its economy even more.   
 
IV.III COSTA RICA 
IV.III.I Costa Rica Natural Resources 
 
     Costa Rica has a consolidated democracy. Its greatest natural resources are 
hydroelectric power, forest (flowers and plants), and fishery products. The agricultural 
products of Costa Rica (6.5% of GDP), are pineapples, coffee, bananas, sugar, rice, fruits, 
corn, beans and potatoes.  25.5% of the GDP comes from the manufacturing and services 
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industries. Costa Rica has attracted high tech electronic components and medical 
equipment manufacturing MNCs. Leather, textiles, and apparel, tires, food processing, 
construction materials, fertilizer, and plastic products are important industries too. 
Commerce, ecotourism and services represent a large part of Costa Rica economy (68% 
of the GDP).
146
  
 
IV.III.II Costa Rica Economy 
 
Costa Rica‟s GDP is $1.5 trillion, (2010).  For 2011, its Total Growth GDP is 3.0. Costa 
Rica‟s GDP per capita is $13.628147 (TABLES 5-6). Unemployment is 5.5% and 
Inflation 5.3% (Table, 9).
148
 Costa Rica attracted $1.3 billion in FDI inflows in 2009, and 
in 2010, Costa Rica received $1.412 billion FDI inflows (Table 4). The exports of Costa 
Rica were $10.1 billion (2010) and imports $13.32 billion. The public debt of Costa Rica 
is 42.4 % of GDP (2010 est.). Costa Rica external debt is $8,829billion.
149
 Costa Rica has 
successfully attracted companies such as the Intel Corporation, which employs 3,200 
people, Procter and Gamble which employs 1200 people, Boston Scientific, Allergan, 
Hospira, and Baxter Healthcare.
150
 Costa Rica has business relationships with other 
American companies such as Del Monte, Dole and Chiquita for the processing of bananas 
and pineapples. 
151
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IV.III.III. Costa Rica Human Capital  
 
      Costa Rica‟s minimum wage is US$ 15.94 per day, the highest in Latin America, 
 (Table 2) and the poverty rate is 18.6%. Costa Rica has been able to attract FDI, because 
its population has a literacy rate of 94.4%, with 9 years of compulsory schooling and 
attendance rates of 99%. Life expectancy for men is 74.61 years and women 79.94 
years.
152
 Costa Rica has a human development index (composite indices) of 0.725 (as 
2010), above the regional level. Costa Rica has had, in the past, a social safety net; this 
has worn out due to the economic constraints of a dedicated budget, of only 2% of the 
GDP.
153
 Costa Rica, like other Latin American countries, has serious problems of 
government corruption, (Graded 5.3 CPI. Table 3).  The homicide rate in Costa Rica is 
8.3/100,000. This is a low homicide rate compared to Mexico, but high compared to 
Argentina (5.2).   
  Since the 1970‟s Costa Rica has invested in secondary education, computers in its 4000 
schools, and obligatory English classes. The Country committed 28% of its budget in the 
1970‟s to achieve the highest levels of literacy. There are four universities and a 
technological institute that teach science and technology. The training is focused on 
studies in technology, agriculture, mining, and administration. 
154
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IV.III.IV ANALYSIS OF COSTA RICA’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
 Costa Rica, a country with a great tradition of democratic political institutions, is 
geographically small, but this country attracted FDI worth $ 1.4 billion. It is ranked top 
eighth country in FDI inflows. Costa Rica grants tax incentives in the sectors that they 
consider are strategic, specifically in technological areas where the spillovers to the 
education and training of the employees are suitable for its citizens. This economic policy 
was based in Costa Rica‟s strategy of economic liberalization: Firstly, to improve the 
conditions necessary to participate in the global market through agreements with Mexico, 
Canada, Chile, and the CARICOM (Caribbean Community Secretariat) and later CAFTA 
(The United States- Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement). 
Secondly, Costa Rica sought to attract FDI of greater quality (Cordero, 2008).
155
 During 
the 1990‟s the increase in FDI was the result of liberalization of the economy, 
privatization, and utilities.
156
  Costa Ricans are known for their vigilance concerning 
conservation of natural resources and ecotourism. Costa Rica decided not to exploit the 
oil resources of the country, but only natural gas.
157
  Thus, Costa Rican President Laura 
Chinchilla has insisted that she will not allow oil exploration, only gas.
158
  Costa Rica 
decided to look for high tech manufacture companies, in electronics and medical 
instruments.
159
  
      Yet, Costa Rica struggles with an inefficient government bureaucracy that makes 
procedures time consuming and burdensome for trade (2011 Index of Economic 
Freedom). The World Bank “Doing business” ranks Costa Rica the 125 economy out of 
183. Costa Rican bureaucratic problems are those of slow services, for example, 
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construction permits require as much as 131 days. Other issues for investors are problems 
related with the protection of investors, enforcing contracts and closing a business is time 
consuming (114 days).  
 Costa Rica is trying to attract FDIs in infrastructure and telecommunications. These are 
strategic areas for Costa Rica since its infrastructure is in disrepair and the demand for 
computing, and telecommunication services have increased. Thus, Costa Rica is in 
immediate need of FDI in services and infrastructure. 
160
 
     Costa Rica, like other Latin American countries, has serious problems of 
governmental corruption, (Graded 5.3 CPI.Table 3), combined with inefficient 
government bureaucracies that make procedures time consuming and burdensome for 
trade (2011 Index of Economic Freedom).  
     The most valuable asset of Costa Rica is the education of its people.  Costa Rica has a 
93% rate of literacy and educational standards are high.
161
  Yet Intel President, Graig 
Barret pointed out the need of more technological and bilingual education, especially the 
need for more engineers in a variety of fields.
162
  
  
 
IV.IV. BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA 
IV.IV.I Venezuela Natural Resources 
 
    The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, better known as Venezuela, has a socialist 
government, and it is rich in natural resources. It has oil, natural gas, hydro electrical 
power, gold, iron, bauxite, and diamonds. 
163
 Venezuela has great natural gas and oil 
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reserves. 
164
 Venezuela was ranked the top ten oil producer in the world in 2009,
165
 but 
ranked 13
th
 in 2011.
166
  Venezuela is very dependent on oil revenues; in fact, a third of its 
GDP comes from oil revenues. In 2006, President Hugo Chavéz announced the 
nationalization of oil fields managed by foreign companies.
167
 PDVSA (Petroleos de 
Venezuela. S.A.), the state oil company of Venezuela, was producing, in 1998, 3.2 million 
barrels per day. After a decade of Chavez‟s government, the production of oil had 
dropped 2.4 million barrels.
168
 In June of 2011, the crude oil production rose to 2.78 
million barrels a day.  
 
IV.IV.II Venezuela Economy 
     The political and economic policies of President Hugo Chávez Frías, (incumbent 
president since 1999), have caused a negative GDP- real growth rate, (-1.9% in 2010 and 
-3.3% in 2009), and created adverse conditions for attracting FDI inflows $-3100.00 
million. The GDP is $ 349.1 billion, Unemployment is 7.9%, and Inflation is as high as 
29.792%
169
  (Tables. 5, 6, 10).  Exports were led by oil in 2009, accounting for $60.9 
billion, with imports in the amount of $38.5 billion. PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela. 
S.A.), is the most important company in Venezuela. Chavéz made the decision to 
nationalize many MNCs, companies like CEMEX, Compania Anonima Nacional 
Telefonos de Venezuela CANTV (Verizon Communications), 
170
 and foreign oil 
companies, have frightened other MNCs away from investing in Venezuela.
 171
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IV.IV.III. Venezuela Human Capital  
    Venezuela‟s population is 28 million people, 50% of Venezuelans are under the age of 
25. Poverty rate in Venezuela is 28.5% (Table 1). The minimum wage per day in 
Venezuela is $10.7 (Table 2). Life expectancy in Venezuela is 73.58% (as 2007) and 
infant mortality rate was 16/1000live births.  Literacy rate in Venezuela is 95% with 9 
years compulsory education.  The human development index (Composite indices) is 
0.696, Venezuela human development index is below the regional level. Moreover, 
Venezuela has a high rate of homicide of 52.0/100,000 people. This is a very high 
homicide rate. It is even higher than Brazil, but not as high as Jamaica (59.5). 
Transparency international graded the level of corruption in Venezuela as 2.0 (on a scale 
of 1 to 10), making it the country with the least transparency in Latin America (CPI, table 
3).
 172
   
   
IV.IV.IV. ANALYSIS OF VENEZUELA’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
OUTCOMES 
 
   Venezuela is an example of how political instability and the sudden change in political 
systems, from capitalism to socialism, affects FDI inflows and the standard of life for the 
general population. Venezuela has been de-consolidating its democracy since Hugo 
Chavez achieved the Presidency in 1999. His socialist regime, expropriations, economic 
policies and regulations have damaged FDI inflows. 
173
 In most of the economic 
indicators Venezuela ranks low, or has descended into negative numbers (FDI inflows are 
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$-3100.00). Table 5 shows the sharp contrast of total GDP growth, starting in 2008 when 
the government was still capitalist and FDI inflows totaled US$ 349 million and falling to 
an inflow of US$ -3.105 billion in 2009, seen mainly as a result of expropriations during 
2009 (ECLAC, 2009).
174
 Venezuela and Cuba are in a group of other world nations with 
less than $0.9 billion FDI (UNCTAD. Ch. II, 2010, p.45).   
             Even while Chávez increased the minimum wage to $10.7 per day, one of the 
highest in Latin America (Table 2), inflation soared to almost 30% (Table 10), remaining 
high from 2008 through 2011. The mean real remuneration (Table 6) fell to negative 
numbers in 2008, with no data available for 2009 or following years. However, we know 
that prices have more than doubled, from an index of 103.1 in 2008 to 235.3 in June 2011 
(Central Bank of Venezuela Statistics),
175
 with inflation of 30% (Table 10). Chavez 
claimed that the increase in the minimum wage was “remarkable, but not enough,” and 
added in April of 2011, that this minimum wage was the “highest in Latin America.”176 
This is not a reality anymore, (as June 2011).  Costa Rica now has the highest minimum 
wage, followed by Argentina, Panama, Paraguay and Chile (Table 2).  
 President Chavez‟ socialist authoritarian populist regime has control of the parliament, 
and the judicial system. Chavéz has made changes to the constitution that allows him to 
abolish term limits. He wants to run for the presidency in 2012 and beyond. He also has 
made changes in the constitution to fit his vision of a 21st century socialist Venezuela 
and government control of the electoral institution (Consejo Nacional Electoral CNE), 
giving the illusion of a “Democratic” government. 177   
     Chávez does not escape the clientelism that has characterized many countries of Latin 
America. The government of Chávez redistributes the state resources among the poor 
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people of his country.  He also brings in Cuban doctors to provide medical services in 
poor neighborhoods, assuring their allegiance and support for his presidency, allowing 
him to maintain control of all the political institutions and the private sector. His 
government is fashioned in the image of the Cuban government, and barrows the best 
clientelistic practices of the Mexican official party, the PRI, that stayed in power for 
seven decades. 
178
   President Chávez controls the media, restricting freedom of 
expression. Chávez has also restricted freedom of association and prosecuted political 
opponents. His government has undermined the judicial system, giving a free pass to 
illegalities and abuses of the executive power.
179
  Chávez has supported only those unions 
that go along with his agenda, thus undermining worker‟s rights. 180 
   Chávez expropriated the banks and the unofficial foreign exchange market, 
agribusiness, oil foreign companies, construction and steel MNCs. His policies have 
caused a steep drop in oil production, electricity, and brought about a housing crisis. 
What allows Venezuela to survive without FDI inflows is its oil. Venezuela is highly 
dependent on oil revenues, yet oil production has failed to reach the 3.2 million barrels 
per day that the country was producing before Chavez‟s administration.181 President 
Hugo Chávez is raising state expenditures to fulfill his campaign promises, helping 
people out of poverty. Chávez wants to be reelected for third time, but the economy of 
Venezuela is in deep recession. Yet, Chávez has not been content to spend just oil 
revenues; he has increased borrowing from bond issues. It is estimated that this year the 
public debt will increase to $112.6 billion, but according to Ecoanalitica, the public debt 
could amount to as much as $134 billion in 2011. Venezuela devaluated its currency and 
increased taxes on oil companies in an effort to escalate the government‟s revenues.182 
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   Despite Venezuela‟s great energy resources and having the fourth most powerful river, 
the Orinoco, Venezuela has been rationing electricity and water for the past three 
years.
183
 Chavéz blames the drought in 2009 and consumer‟s overuse of electricity, but 
independent experts argue that the real cause is the lack of investment in infrastructure 
and maintenance.
184
 In 2007, Chavez nationalized the private power industry. There is an 
ever increasing demand for electricity (up 4.5%) that the neglected thermal plants cannot 
supply.
185
 Industries and commerce have been hurt by the many national blackouts.
 186
  
The failure of the government to invest in infrastructure, the expropriations, and the 
government‟s freezing of the utility rates for political gain, have all been contributing 
factors for the decline in FDI inflows.
187
  
     In 2010 President Chavez introduced economic reforms, abolishing taxes on financial 
transactions to attract FDI inflows. However, his political and economic policies, and his 
massive expropriations have scared foreign investors.
188
   In Venezuela, the process of 
starting a business is challenging. The country has a negative ranking in protecting 
investors, registering property, trading across borders, enforcing contracts or closing a 
business (The World Bank, 2011).
 189
  
      Major concerns of foreign investors in Venezuela are policy and monetary instability, 
government expropriations, control of prices of goods and services, the lack of respect for 
contracts and property rights, corruption, and labor restrictions (2011 Index of Economic 
freedom).
 190The World Bank “Doing Business,” has ranked Venezuela in the 172th place 
out of 183 economies (2011).  The results of this rank are similar to those of Cuba, 
especially such issues as not respecting private property or honoring contracts. There is 
little protection for investors and it is time consuming to close or open a business. The 
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economic and political policies and regulations of Chávez have crippled the economy of 
his country.
191
    
   Attracting MNCs from western countries to Venezuela has become increasingly 
difficult mainly because of Chávez economic and political reforms. Chávez has extended 
trade agreements with a host of other troubled countries, including North Korea, Belarus, 
Syria, and Iran.
 192
 Chávez signed several agreements with Iran in the oil, energy, 
industrial and commercial sectors. 
193
 The treaties with Iran drew U.S. sanctions that will 
undoubtedly affect the equipment and machinery necessary to maintain the oil 
industry.
194
  In spite of the economic situation and hyperinflation that his country is 
experiencing, President Chavez still managed to purchase over $4 billion in arms from 
Russia.
195
 Experts of Latin America CEIC Database Team found that Venezuela‟s public 
debt could be as much as 62% of GDP at an exchange rate of 2.6 VEF/USD.
196
 The 
external debt of Venezuela is $55, 610 billion.
197
   
   The standard of living in Venezuela has dropped considerably.  The infant mortality 
jumped from 15 deaths, to 20.6 deaths/1000 living births.
198
 The increase in the infant 
mortality talks of a deterioration of the health care and preventive medicine systems. 
Shortage of housing in Venezuela is triggered by the private property restrictions of the 
Chavez regime and expropriations in the construction sector.  
     Corruption in Venezuela is a serious problem. Critics claim that military and 
government officials are involved in acts of corruption and drug trafficking. 
Transparency international graded Venezuela 2.0, the country with the most corruption in 
Latin America (CPI, table 3).
 199
  There is evidence of judicial corruption associated to 
drug trafficking and money laundering
200
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IV.V. CUBA 
IV.V.I. Cuba Natural Resources 
 
 Cuba, a socialist country has oil for its own consumption, natural gas and electricity. 
This is a tropical country that produces sugar, tobacco, citrus, coffee, rice, potatoes, and 
beans. Its industries are agricultural machinery, sugar, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, 
petroleum, and construction. The principal industry in Cuba is services (tourism), 
contributing 72.9% of its GDP.
201
   
IV.V.II Cuba Economy 
GDP is $ 110.9 billion, Growth is 1.4%, and GDP per capita is 9,700. Inflation is -0.5%. 
The government controls prices of goods and services. This is a country with government 
control of the economy. Cuba has an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy. Moreover, the 
judicial system is based on governmental decisions.
202
  Raul Castro announced measures 
to liberalize the economy, limiting the top political positions to a maximum of ten years 
and promised changes in the government. Cuba is trying to attract FDI inflows by 
privatization of land,
 203
 and government- FDI joint ventures in different enterprises, 
especially in tourism.
 204
 Castro declared that he was committed to eliminate the 
government food rationing program in order to promote domestic and FDI investment in 
agriculture. 
205
 Cuba imports products from Venezuela, China, Spain and the United 
States (7% as of 2009). Cuba exports to China, Canada, Venezuela, Spain and the 
Netherlands (as of 2009).  Cuba public debt in 2010 was 37.2% of the GDP (Economist 
Intelligence Unit), 
206
 and the external debt of Cuba is about 19.750 billion.
207
 Small 
private businesses are not allowed in Cuba. Early in 2010, Raul Castro‟s administration 
made economic changes that will allow Cubans to own and operate small businesses.
208
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IV.V.III Cuba human capital  
     Cuba‟s population is 11,087,330 (July 2011 est.), poverty rate is 20% (Table1). 
Literacy rate is 99.8%, life education expectancy is a total of 18-19 years. Education 
expenditure is 13.6% of the GDP. Cuba has no unemployment or this is as low as 2%.
209
  
Life expectancy at birth is 77.7 years, and infant mortality rate is 4.9 deaths/1,000 live 
births.
 210
 The human development index (Composite indices) is 0.760, one of the highest 
in Latin America, but not as high as Uruguay (0.765), Argentina (0.775) or Chile (0.783). 
Law enforcement in Cuba is one of the strongest in the world. The Human index 
development does not have data of homicide rate since Cuba does not release this data. 
CNN reported that crime is seen as “enemy of the revolution.” Crime in Cuba is 
combated harshly and penalties are high. Crime has increased even if it remains one of 
the lowest rates in the world. The reason is drug trafficking but still Cuba is a very safe 
country.
211
 Moreover, Cuba has problems of corruption that affect how the country does 
business, (graded 3.7 CPI. Table 3).   
 
 IV.V.IV. ANALYSIS OF CUBA’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
   Cuba is a socialist authoritarian country. While the economic situation in Cuba can be 
seen as the result of the U.S. embargo imposed on Cuba, we must also look at 
government control of the economy, control that does not allow free market and 
democratic political institutions.  In 1960 Former Cuban President Fidel Castro, after 
overthrowing the Fulgencio Batista‟s dictatorship, seized private land, nationalized 
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international companies, including U.S. corporations, and overtaxed American products.
 
212
As a result half of the U.S businesses decided not to trade with Cuba.  
     Initially the Eisenhower Administration, imposed trade restrictions on Cuba. In 1962, 
as a result of Cuba‟s decision to expand its trade relations with the Soviet Union, the 
Eisenhower administration enforced the first embargo. 
213
 Cuba‟s economy collapsed 
after the Soviet Union withdrew its support for the country. The U.S. strengthened the 
embargo in 1992 and in 1996 passed the Helms- Burton Act, preventing international 
trade with the U.S. and foreign countries; this was in retaliation for Cuba shooting down 
two U.S. civilian airplanes.
214
 
     However, the Helms-Burton Act has been relaxed during several administrations, 
depending on the political environment.  In 2001 the U.S. agreed to sell food to Cuba 
after the devastation caused by Hurricane Michelle.
215
 This agreement has continued been 
in place, making the United States, the most important food supplier, with sales that 
reached in 2008, $710 million (Suddath, 2009). 
216
 
     In March 2009, Washington lifted restrictions on travel and remittances, relaxing 
limits on sale of food and medicine.  Cuba major business partners are Venezuela, 
Bolivia, China, Russia, Brazil, Vietnam, The Netherlands, France outer territories, 
Canada and the United States.
217
  Scholars agree that the Helms-Burton Act did not have 
the desired results of damaging Cuba‟s economy and opening the country to democracy.  
FDI in Cuba was $2 million in 1990; after the passage of the Helms Burton Act, the FDI 
rose to $74 million by 2000, in 2008 FDI reached  285 million (Bearden, T. 2011). 
218
The 
global economic crisis, weak nickel prices and tourism decreased FDI inflows to 30.6 
million in 2011.
219
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    The Cuban economic market is controlled by the state. It is bureaucratic, lacks 
efficiency, and is riddled with regulations and lengthy procedures, lacking transparency 
and openness.  Obligated by the economic crisis that Cuba is living in, President Raul 
Castro has announced some small economic reforms.
220
 Cuba is trying to reform its 
economy, but how fast can changes come to combat its public and external debt? The 
process of democratization in Cuba is advancing at a slow pace. However, the 
conditioning of financial aid by the Council of the European Union has had an impact on 
the political and economic systems in Cuba.
221
  
   The U.S. embargo, in place since the early 1960‟s did not help to make the necessary 
political and economic changes that Cuba needed. On the contrary, the embargo has 
contributed to the alienation of Cuba from the international community, radicalizing its 
position even further.  More importantly, a combination of the U.S. embargo, hurricanes 
and droughts, and the deficiencies in food rationing of the inefficient Cuban socialist 
system contributed to shortages of food, medicines and other essential necessities of life, 
deteriorating their health and the Cuban population's standard of living, especially 
children‟s health. 222 
    The lesson, in the case of Cuba is clear, when political actors refuse to act rationally, 
even long term sanctions like the U.S. embargo will not bring the democratic changes 
sought, and in the end cause extreme damage to the vulnerable population. Even if 
President Obama eased the sanctions on food and medicines the standard of life for the 
Cuban people will continue to suffer for many years. The embargo did not help Cuba to 
establish the credit that it surely needs.  Cuba‟s government must pay everything with 
cash, creating situations of scarcity of basic foods and other necessities.
223
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   Moreover, sanctions are usually imposed on poor countries.
224
 The ruling classes 
certainly will not live in a shack, but more likely in palaces. They will send their families 
overseas and will go to sleep after a splendid dinner. 
225
They will use their rhetoric 
against the nations or international organizations that sanctioned them, painting them as 
enemies of their country, to shift the attention from the problems of corruption, violations 
of human rights and abuse of power in their own countries. 
226
 However, if the ruling 
classes see their pockets hurt, with their assets compromised, and they begin to suffer the 
scarcity of goods and food, if they are shamed by other nations, and other nations refuse 
to trade with them, dictators will modify their behavior and open themselves to economic 
liberalization, and democratization.
227
 They will begin to make changes in their political 
and economic systems gradually, as not to give the impression of defeat.  However, once 
started, it is a snow ball in motion. They will arrive at the necessary changes to 
implement free market regulations in order to trade and attract FDI inflows.
228
 
     Cuba has many human development problems, with an infrastructure that is in 
disrepair, and scarcity of food and medicines. However, Cuba has the highest level of 
education (99.8%), and its public health system is one of the best in the world. The infant 
mortality rate is an indicator of the quality of health care in a country. Cuba infant 
mortality rate is low (4.9 deaths/1,000 live births). The infant mortality rate is comparable 
to first world countries like Switzerland, United Kingdom, and New Zealand.
229
   
  There is only anecdotal evidence of how much the minimum wage is in Cuba, the 
lowest of all (less than a dollar a day), but the economic indicators let us see that the real 
urban minimum wage is less than 1.5. If this minimum wage were not subsidized, we 
would infer that poverty on the island is widespread. However, housing, health care, 
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education, and food are all subsidized. 
230
Indirect evidence of poverty and 
malnourishment is found in the programs of the United Nations aimed to combat anemia, 
and hunger in Cuba.
231
 FDI inflows are very low ($30.6 million), the external debt is $ 
19,750 billion and continues growing. Even though Cuba is a small country, with such 
small FDI, the external debt seems huge.
232
 Moreover, Cuba has problems of corruption 
that affect how the country does business, (graded 3.7 CPI. Table 3).  Customs officials 
ask for bribes or confiscate the belongings of Cuban citizens returning to the island to 
visit. Reportedly, there have been convictions on the island for corruption.
233
Rankings 
and reports on “Doing business” are not available because of the U.S. embargo. 
According to the 2011 Index of Economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation, Cuba‟s 
economy is inefficient, with heavy regulations, and property is severely regulated, 
imports and exports are dominated by the government.
234
  
    If Cuba finally decides to open itself to democracy and free the market, the people of 
Cuba are well prepared to learn new technologies. Educated citizens and Cuba‟s public 
health system represent true assets for investment in the island. Cuba has the highest 
literacy rate (99.8%), followed by Costa Rica (94, 4%), Brazil (88%), and Mexico 
(86.1)
235
.  If Cuba finally decides to look at the future, it would be wise to select the 
MNCs that suit most its needs, learning new technologies, managerial skills, and 
improving Cuba‟s own domestic companies.  
    The Political system in Cuba is stable, but it is a closed society with few freedoms. The 
incumbent President Raul Castro is also president of the Council of State and President of 
the Council of Ministers since 2008.  It is a communist government, there are no 
opposition parties. Raul Castro was elected by the unicameral National Assembly for a 
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five year term by unanimity. In reality Raul Castro inherited the position from his brother 
Fidel Castro who was in power for 47 years.  The legislative branch is unicameral. There 
are neither opposition parties nor free universal suffrage.
 236
  Despite accusations of 
violations of human rights, and denial of freedoms to the population (freedom of 
assembly, association, speech, movement, and the press),
 237
 Cuba has been a United 
Nations member since 2000.  
      Cuba imports 80% of its food supplies, paying for them in cash, because Cuba does 
not have credit.  Droughts, hurricanes, increases in food prices, the Cuban food rationing 
program, the global financial crisis and the U.S. embargo have led to malnourishment, 
hunger and scarcity of food, affecting the Cuban population, especially Cuban children.  
The living standard of Cubans has decreased considerably.
 238
   Cuba receives support to 
combat hunger and anemia through the “National Plan on Prevention and Control of 
Anemia in the Five Eastern Provinces of Cuba" (World Food Programme).
239
    
     Even if Cuba's economic reforms are very low pace, the country is making an effort to 
open itself to privatizations and to a certain extent, the free market, trying to give the 
appearance of a democratizing government. Cuba knows that the country cannot survive 
outside the global economy.  Cuba needs to become part of the international community 
and obtain the foreign aid that it needs.  Cuba is a participating country in the Secretariat 
of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, (ACP), an ACP- European Union 
partnership.
 240
    
     Cuba obtained from the ACP- European Union, economic resources, (€20 million for 
the period of 2011-2013) food support, environmental and climate change training 
(European Union, External Action, 2011).
 241
  The Council of the European Union 
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discusses with Cuba, "issues of mutual interest including the respect and promotion of 
human rights." The Council makes sure that Cuba understands and signs a commitment 
that prioritizes “principles of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
(Council of the European Union, 10939/09; Presse 174). 
242
      
      
 
IV.VI. DISCUSSION 
 
      To successfully attract FDI, economic, political and social reforms must be stable and 
durable, regardless of the personal political ideology of the incumbent president.  
Uncertain political environments can be damaging to governments looking for foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Surveys taken of corporate executives (Deloitte & Touche, 2001, 
as cited by Stephen Cohen, 2007) on how they evaluate a market when looking to invest 
in a foreign location reveal that companies do not want pervasive corruption, or 
inconsistent regulation, political or social instability.
243
  Aside from the top factor of 
gaining access to customers, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) executives cited a 
stable social and political atmosphere, low crime, safety, and transparency in business 
regulations.
244
  
  The type of popular government is a consideration for FDI inflows.
245
  It has been the 
general consensus that MNCs prefer authoritarian governments because of the lower-cost 
workforce and “the lack of constraints of authoritarian regimes,” favors MNCs operations 
in the host countries (Jensen, N. 2003)
246
 However, Li found that the free market of 
autocratic regimes is hurt when they adopt lower tax incentives, maintain restrictions and 
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tariff barriers and adopt an strategy of lower levels of incentives than those without 
restrictions (Li, Q, 2006).
247
 The 2011 Index of Economic Freedom found that rules, 
regulations and tariffs are burdensome in Venezuela and Cuba.
248
  
      In Latin America, the prevalence of authoritarian populist regimes and military 
governments poses a political and economic dilemma that cannot be explained by the 
positive association between socio-economic modernization and democracy (Collier, D, 
Cardoso F.H. 1979).
249
 The social, economic and political tensions caused by neoliberal 
policies, poverty, inequality, eroded minimum wages, and a dependent capitalism, is 
helping to bring back authoritarian regimes in Latin America.  Expropriations, 
nationalization of private businesses, huge inefficient bureaucracies, a political and social 
environment that violates fundamental human rights are factors that discourage free 
trade.
250
 
    The Socialist, populist, authoritarian-democratic divide makes it especially difficult for 
MNCs to operate. The political and social environment toward MNCs can, at times be 
hostile. Multinational Corporations in Latin American countries are frequently accused of 
impunity and unlawful behavior that affects the friendly political environment needed to 
continue their operations in these countries. 
251
  Furthermore, the host governments are 
often accused of using preferential treatment and relaxed law enforcement to favor 
MNCs.
252
   
     While many countries of Latin America are striving to have strong political 
institutions, to apply their constitution and laws, building strong judicial systems and 
effective governments, populism and authoritarianism
253
 are present in Latin America, 
with negative effects on FDI inflows. MNCs find themselves in an unknown political 
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territory; they lack a frame of reference when trying to discern the political system and 
economic regulations in Latin America‟s authoritarian or democratizing countries. The 
approach of populist authoritarian countries concerning the economics of income 
redistribution while ignoring inflation, high public debt and external debt discourage FDI 
in Latin American countries.
254
 
  Different political systems and ideologies hinder MNCs, lowering the odds of their 
desired performance. Latin American countries demonstrate that not only is economics 
driving the markets, but the political institutions, their actors, economic and social 
policies, education, technology, the societies and their ideologies.
255
 MNCs can have 
different goals than those of the host country; this causes friction in their interactions. 
Political and economic instability, expropriation, and corruption are top concerns of 
MNCs when dealing with host countries under authoritarian regimes.
256
    
    The type of political system is a strong consideration when investing in a Latin 
American country. The political system of the host country influences the 
competitiveness to attract FDI inflows.
257
 Democratic political institutions attract more 
FDI inflows (Jensen, N. M., 2006).
 258
  Nathan Jensen found that democratic governments 
attract as much as 78 percent more FDI than autocratic governments.
259
 Jensen found that 
Democratic countries attract as much as 70 percent more FDI as a percentage of GDP 
than authoritarian regimes. 
260
 This is the case of Costa Rica, Brazil and Mexico, but also 
of countries like Chile, Argentina, Peru, Panama, and Colombia (ECLAC, Table 4). 
     Democracy has a positive effect on FDI inflows that more than balances out any 
negative effects. Millner argues that democracy is the political institutional change that 
drives free trade and the spread of democracy to other countries (Milner, 1999).
261
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Diamond argues that considering a country has consolidated its democracy (Diamond, L. 
1997), that country has to ensure more transparent, accountable, liberal and representative 
democratic structures; secondly, the country has to strengthen the political, judicial 
institutions and political parties; and thirdly, improvement of the political system, 
political institutions and economy (enforcement of law, combatting corruption, and 
respecting human rights and liberties).
262
 
         O‟Rourke and Taylor found that the answer to the question “does democracy 
promote free trade is complex because it depends on the political and economic policies 
across countries.
263
 However, Democracy can have positive effects on attracting FDI if 
elections are perceived by the population as transparent and if there is a succession of 
power that encourages free trade.
264
  When political actors are elected freely by the 
population, the power goes to labor and free trade and does not stay in the elites or in the 
hands of the few.
265
 Free markets are not only business and profit. The spillovers of 
MNCs help people to have a better standard of living. MNCs create employment, bring 
new technologies and managerial skills necessary for the development of domestic 
enterprises. MNCs help to improve regulations and fair competition with domestic 
companies.  FDI Inflows increase productivity and economic growth.
266
  
    MNCs are not only looking for a country with free trade policies, but they are looking 
for long term social and political stability to consolidate their industries; social and 
political stability is what democratic political institutions can provide. New Institutional 
theory points out that “institutional environments that provide strong political, social, and 
legal institutions reduce transaction costs, protect property rights, and lessen the 
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uncertainty of doing business on foreign soil,” attracting more FDI inflows (Martinez, A. 
C. 2008-2009).
267
 
    The new country profile of attracting FDI is not only free market regulations, but 
having social policies in place that promote social stability, infrastructure and educated, 
technologically able, healthy human capital. 
268
Multinational corporations consider socio-
economic outcomes.
269
 Martinez found that governments with pro-social policies that 
decrease income inequalities, use public resources to combat poverty, providing a safety 
net with minimal welfare protection to their citizens, attract more FDI.
270
 In her study, 
Martinez uses social indicators like population, inflation, gender equality, equity of 
public resource use, building human resources, social protection and labor, environmental 
sustainability and economic indicators like GDP, GDP growth and inflation rate, FDI 
inflows.
271
 Factors studied are open economy and oil producer.   
     Martinez used some of the social indicators used by the World Bank. No factor can be 
used by itself, but it is the sum of the different social indicators that predict social and 
economic stability.
272
 For example, population is an indicator of market size. Large 
populations and higher GDP per capita, attract more FDI, because demand for services 
increases. A high and/or variable rate of inflation, weak currency, high public debt and 
low GDP growth are predictors of internal economic instability and increases the costs of 
exports. It is also an indication of the inability of the country to have consistent monetary 
policy (Martinez, A.C. 2008-2009).
273
  
      United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
274
 and World 
Bank
275
 stress education, social development and income equality as social factors that 
attract FDI, because MNCs are more interested in skilled man power than cheap labor 
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cost.  The trends show that MNCs will be more interested in innovation and technology-
intensive activities that require educated, technologically skilled human capital. It is no 
longer the trend, nor will it be again, directed only to the “most labor intensive, low value 
added components of the value chain” (UNCTAD 2010). 276  MNCs are concentrating 
more on investing in developing countries in South East and South-East Asia, and to a 
lesser extent in Latin America, where they find a more technological educated working 
force, for example, Singapore is a very transparent country, with a representative 
democracy and technological educated working force. Another example is India, a 
democratic country with technological trained working force, and with increasing 
demand for services.
277
  
     To measure social-economic outcomes, private and non-governmental organizations 
are also incorporating the human development index into their database. The Human 
Development Index measures adult literacy, primary, secondary and tertiary school 
enrollments and living standards, (measured by GDP per capita), including poverty rate 
and homicide.
278
  Countries with consolidated democracies score very high in human 
development index. This is the case of Norway, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States. In Latin America, countries like Chile, Argentina and Uruguay with strong 
democracies and free market policies score high in human development Index. Cuba 
scores high in human development. Costa Rica and Mexico score above the regional 
average, while Venezuela is below the regional average.   
     This is the same model of social-economic outcomes used by the International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Forum, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Human Development index to help 
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host countries to attract FDI by promoting social stability and human development. The 
information is also used by international investors to find a host country with the social 
and economic policies that decrease uncertainty and promote stability. The Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLAC or CEPAL in Spanish) an organization of the 
United Nations, helps Latin American and Caribbean countries to reinforce economic ties 
among countries, tracks the FDI inflows of each country and helps them to understand 
how to attract more FDI. The organization also promotes region social development 
(ECLAC).
279
 
            Non-governmental and private corporations that rank countries follow the same 
profile of social-economic outcomes and compile social and economic information to 
invest in a foreign country. Thus, this author used the information collected from non-
governmental organizations, public and private organizations. Many of these 
organizations used economic and social indicators and multiple surveys of MNCs 
operations, to analyze the potential financial and politic risks for MNCs.  
     The Index of Economic Freedom uses information from experts and MNCs executives 
in the region, on the political and judicial system of the countries studied, research data 
on corruption, size of the population, economic indicators such as GDP, annual growth, 
GDP per Capita, unemployment, inflation and FDI inflows. The Index of Economic 
Freedom also analyses, economic regulation reforms, tariffs and social problems that 
affect FDI inflows.
280
 EDC Canada,
281
 the World Fact Book,
282
 Economic Watch
283
 and 
Economist Intelligence Unit,
284
 use information collected from MNCs operations, 
political and economic analysts in the region, and research collected by private and non-
governmental sources, including social indicators. 
285
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     Many of these organizations take into consideration social problems that may affect 
directly MNCs. For example, MNCs view corruption as an additional cost “of doing 
business or a tax on profits,”(Al-Sadig, A. 2009).286 Corruption affects directly profit and 
every step of doing business in a foreign country. For example, open and closing a 
business, permits, investment licenses, police protection, and tax assessments.
287
  
     The 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
288
 is the most respected measure of 
domestic and public sector corruption.  The CPI methodology comprises the surveys of 
respected worldwide institutions, including the World Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit, 
World Economic Forum, and Freedom House-Nations in Transit (Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2010, Long Methodological Brief, 2010).
289
  Denmark, New Zealand, and 
Singapore, are at the top of the scale with a grade of 9.3, or very transparent countries, 
followed by Finland and Sweden 
(9.2). The study found that 176 countries were highly corrupt (five or less on a scale of 
10). 
Somalia (1.5), Myanmar, Afghanistan (1.4) and Iraq (1.5) have the highest levels of 
corruption.
290
  In Latin America, the countries with the highest levels of corruption are 
Paraguay, and Haiti. Venezuela is the least transparent country in Latin America, while 
the most transparent countries are Chile and Uruguay. Puerto Rico and Costa Rica are 
just above the level of high corruption (5.0), while the rest of Latin America exhibits high 
levels of corruption
291
 (Table 3). When corruption occurs at the highest levels of 
government, it damages the public trust in the state political institutions, decreases the 
opportunities to attract FDI, causing a diversion of resources for infrastructure, education, 
health and housing.
292
  Corruption has a devastating effect on the confidence that the 
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citizens of a country have in the political institutions. It undermines democratic 
governance, and fair competition, providing access to economic, political and 
governmental resources to some parties, but not to others, through bribes, violating the 
law, and thus losing the equality and openness central to a democratic government. 
293
  
  There are cultural, social and economic factors that can either increase the levels of 
corruption or decrease them.  Sandoz and Koetzle studied fifty countries, on the 
perceived level of corruption, defined as “the misuse of public office for private gain.”  
The variation in corruption levels are based on the host country and its political-economic 
structure, democratic policies and regulations, and international economy integration 
(Sandholtz-Koetzle, 2000).
294
  The authors took into consideration for their study, 
average income, and the degree of economic freedom, contrary to what it is found in 
government state control economies. Low incomes incentivize corruption because 
economic growth is minimal and will not create wealth for the population (Table 1).   
     Thus, for poor countries with economic insecurity and low incomes, individuals will 
need to find an income to supplement their salaries. A bribe may be worth paying, if the 
giver obtains more money as a result of the transaction. The person that receives the bribe 
also increases his income (Table 2).   
          Sandholtz and Koetzle found that levels of corruption are higher: 
“ 1) the lower the average income; 2) the greater the extent of state control of the 
economy; 3) the weaker democratic norms and practices are, 4) the lower the degree of 
integration in the world economy, and 5) the smaller the share of the population with a 
Protestant affiliation” (Sandholtz-Koezle, 2000).    
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Corruption can be immersed in the culture, society and the economy of the host country. 
Corruption is universal; it has been with us since ancient times.
295
   Corruption is what 
enables dictators to seize power, they rise by electoral fraud. Corruption fuels 
revolutions, violence, civil wars, stealing the assets of a country, leaving the majority of 
the population in poverty and indebted for generations.  States with weak political 
institutions and corrupt officials have stolen the assets of these countries. Corruption 
occurs at every level of society.
296
   
    Many of private and non-governmental organizations collect data from the Corruption 
Perceptions Index to include them in the countries‟ profile. Corruption and political 
instability are considerations that MNCs investigate before embarking on investment in a 
country. Getz and Volkema define corruption as the “abuse of public roles and resources 
for private benefit or the misuse of office for nonofficial ends” (as cited by Robertson & 
Watson, 2004).
297
 Sandholtz and Koezle found that the level of corrupt behaviors 
decreases if, firstly, political and judicial institutions give people enough opportunities 
and incentives, or rewards and penalties (law enforcement). Secondly, the political 
culture of the country.  Political culture is defined as a “repertoire of cognition, feelings, 
and schemes of evaluation that process experience into action” (Sandhotz and Koezle, 
2000).
 298
 If there is corruption, or a culture tolerant of corruption, upright law 
enforcement is required to sanction the corrupt individuals and to correct the behavior.  
When investing in a foreign country, law enforcement, a free market economy, strength 
of political institutions, and a long tradition of democratic ruling are positive signs 
towards investing in a foreign country.
299
 
58 
 
 
       According to the World Bank, to attract FDI, host countries must be aware of the 
social and economic profile that MNCs want. Economic indicators most frequently used 
are Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita GDP, economic growth, total growth of 
GDP, exports and imports, outstanding external and public debt. Social indicators such as 
life expectancy, adult literacy rate, health, and unemployment, percentage of people 
below the poverty line (earning less than $1 a day) education, quality of life, healthcare 
system, crime rates, and political instability are all important to assess. 
300
 The estimation 
of the United Nations‟ human poverty index gives a better indication if the population 
does, or does not have the opportunities and basic needs that they need to have a “decent 
standard of life.”  301 
   Another indicator that private, and non-governmental organizations use is whether if a 
country produces oil or not.  If the host country produces oil there are more probabilities 
that the country receives higher FDI inflows. 
302
However, many countries have made oil 
production the cornerstone of their income. This is the case of Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela. 
         “Dutch Disease,” also known as the resource curse, this economic phenomenon 
explains the increasing exploitation of a natural resource, leaving other sectors of the 
economy underdeveloped (Montgomery Graham E. 2005).
303
  Mexico and Venezuela 
have relied so much on oil production, making their agriculture and manufacturing 
industries less competitive, and leaving oil as the major source of the economy. This may 
be beginning to happen in Brazil. This country has a strong agricultural sector but the 
eyes of investors are fixed on the new found reserves of oil. Governments ill with the 
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“Dutch disease”304 become wasteful; oil becomes the fuel of social programs and lavish 
spending for popular political support.  
      Mexico‟s huge public spending joined with the bad management of PEMEX for the 
past seven decades, did little to alleviate poverty, or improve adult literacy rates to the 
levels of Costa Rica or Cuba. Thus, Michael Ross at University of California found that 
oil rich countries have more child mortality, and malnourishment as it is the case of 
Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil. There is a struggle over the oil that results in weak 
political institutions and less social growth and human development.  The abundance of 
oil and the high revenues that its commercialization brings to the country creates, in 
private or governmental hands, corruption, rent seeking behavior, rapaciousness and even 
civil conflict.
305
 Thus a majority of investments will go to what it is perceived as the big 
catch, the oil exploitation, leaving underdeveloped the other industrial sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing. Since oil exploitation requires few unskilled and skilled 
jobs, the largest sector of the population will suffer a loss of human development.  Oil 
produces great revenues without the need to educate the population. The volatility tied to 
the price of oil mostly hurts the poor, while the richness of the commodity is concentrated 
in the hands of the few.
 306
   
  There is corruption in many oil companies controlled by the government, such as 
diverting revenues to private interests or giving contracts to friends and relatives. Thus, 
control of this resource stays in the hands of the few.  We only have to look at the long 
list of repeated corruption scandals in the oil companies, PEMEX (Mexico), 
307
 
PETROBRAS (Brazil),
308
 and PDVSA (Venezuela) to see how wide spread the problem 
is.
309
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      While the abundance of oil is producing great revenues, few countries open a fund for 
a foreseeable fall in oil prices or a scheme of stabilization. The government control oil 
companies do not dedicate a budget for repairs of the oil wells, machinery and 
infrastructure while there is oil in abundance. If they have such plan, some countries use 
the fund for other purposes.
 310
   However, oil revenues did not change the high levels of 
poverty in Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela.    
IV.VI.I. CONCLUSIONS 
 
    The Conclusions of this study reveal that MNC‟s prefer Latin American countries with 
democratic governments and free market regulations.   Contrasting Costa Rica and Cuba, 
Costa Rica attracted more FDI inflows, mainly because its strong democracy and free 
market policies. Cuba‟s economy is to some extent crippled by the U.S. embargo but its 
heavy economic regulations, investments conditioned to government participation, and 
inefficient bureaucracy hurt its economy.  Despite outstanding literacy levels, health care, 
and the softened sanctions during the present U.S. administration, Cuba is confronting 
problems in attracting more FDIs.  The reason for less FDI inflows is a combination of 
the U.S. embargo and Cuba‟s authoritarian  
regime and governmental control of the economy that hinders FDI.  
    Likewise, Venezuela‟s tight control of the economy, inefficient bureaucracy, 
expropriations and the lack of guarantees and protections to investors that characterized 
authoritarian or socialist governments reduced considerably FDI inflows. According to 
the World Bank “Doing Business” rank and the 2011 Economic Freedom Index, MNCs 
have problems investing in Cuba and Venezuela because of the restrictions on property 
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ownership, strict government control of the economy, high bureaucratization of the state, 
with inconsistent regulations, high taxes, and corruption.  
    Venezuela‟s political and economic reforms toward socialism have lowered the 
standard of living of their citizens, and increasing poverty related problems like homicide 
rate, and infant mortality. The centralization of the political and economic systems has 
caused inflation, scarcity of basic foods, control of prices and violations of human rights. 
Venezuela and Cuba need to open to democratization and free market policies if they 
want to attract FDI. Cuba and Venezuela need a more democratic and stable political and 
economic environment that offers guarantees to protect foreign investments and respect 
contracts. 
     Brazil and Mexico are the top ranked countries that attracted the most FDI inflows, 
despite the violence and criminality in these countries.  It was evident from the analysis 
of the World Bank “Doing Business,” and the 2011 Economic Freedom index that MNCs 
prefer democratic governments over authoritarian governments because the political and 
economic stability that democratic governments offer.  Moreover, MNCs avoided 
countries with socialist regimes, and authoritarian regimes, for fear of expropriations, 
lack of contract enforcement or protection to the investor.  
     This author found that Mexico and Brazil need to privilege education for their 
citizens, accessible health services, human rights, clear political and social policies and 
strong democratic political institutions if they want to be competitive to attract FDI 
inflows. Even if cheap labor was an important factor for investors, the major 
considerations for MNCs were a democratic government, educated and healthy human 
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capital, small and efficient bureaucracies, free market regulations, enforcing contracts 
and protection of investors. 
      Brazil, Mexico and Costa Rica will have to depend less on FDIs, while increasing 
productivity, innovation and technology. These countries will need to implement efficient 
social programs. Costa Rica with fewer natural resources relied on its well educated 
human capital and ecotourism, to grow their economy, while Venezuela, Mexico, and 
possibly Brazil, may have contracted the “Dutch Disease,” or the resource curse. This 
economic phenomenon explains the increasing exploitation of a natural resource, leaving 
the other sectors of the economy underdeveloped. 
   All of the countries studied need less corruption, less bureaucracy, and more fiscal 
simplification to attract FDI and maximize FDI inflows to grow their economies and 
decrease the economic disparities among the population.  The social and economic 
indicators demonstrate that Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica, are not only supplementing 
their economies with FDI, but without FDI inflows these countries‟ economies would 
barely survive.  
   The global economy is not black and white, but has many different tonalities. It has 
problems and advantages that are balanced according to the national interests of each 
country.  The global economy exposes countries to virtual borders and interactions, to the 
exchange of peoples, with different nationalities and perceptions of their sovereignty.  
Even when there is an anarchical society of states, first world countries like the United 
States and those of the European Union have more leverage and give order to the 
international economic system. Economic interdependence is unavoidable.
311
 It is better 
to be in, than out, as Cuba and Venezuela are beginning to realize. 
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   FDI helps host countries to diversify and invest in education, health care, infrastructure, 
and create more wealth for more people.  When states enter to the global economy, they 
have to gear their political and economic systems to more transparency and 
accountability.  International organizations are vigilant pursuers of violations of human 
rights and push for more democratic changes.  The United States, and the European 
Union impose preconditions on states to promote democratic institutions and policies, to 
respect human rights, protect the environment, treat foreign and domestic companies on 
equal terms, making improvements in the health and education of its citizens. In 
exchange, countries obtain international aid, scholarships and grants to educate their 
citizens along with financial aid for programs that increase human development. 
    There cannot be effective liberalization of the economy and steady economic growth 
and development without political and social reforms. Economy is not just finances, but a 
free market is linked to social and economic outcomes. Economic indicators such as 
GDP, GDP per Capita, minimum wage, economic growth are taken into consideration 
when MNCs invest in a country. However, the main factors that attracts MNCs to invest 
in a country is democratic political institutions, educated working force, and free market 
regulations.  MNCs prefer democratic governments that enforce contracts, and protect the 
investor.  MNC want laws that are enforced and permit a good relationship with the host 
state.   
  Good economic policies cannot stand by themselves. Economic policies need good 
social policies to benefit the citizens of the host country and contribute to the 
development in technology and domestic businesses.  Developing countries must be 
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aware that raising their social and economic outcomes will help them to attract FDI 
inflows.  
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Tabl1. Poverty Rates, by Country, 2007* 
 
 
*Source: American Dialogue. Social Policy Brief No. 1; November, 2009. The original source 
and note as cited by this publication: “ECLAC Social Panorama 2008, Table A1 p. 81 (Spanish 
edition); ECLAC Social Panorama 2007, Table I.3 p. 62 (Spanish edition).” 
Note: “Data are for closest year available to year listed. Data for Argentina, Cuba, and 
Uruguay are for urban areas only. Data for Cuba refers to ‘population at risk of poverty.’” 
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TABLE 2. MINIMUM WAGES IN COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA 
 PER DAY IN U.S. DOLLARS* 
 
 
*Conversion to USD Currency as July 13, 2011. 
**Sources: Official web pages of the Latin American countries’ governments 
   mentioned, and newspapers.312 
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Table 3. Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, Latin American Countries* 
Country Grade 
Chile 7.2 
Uruguay 6.9 
Puerto Rico 5.8 
Costa Rica 5.3 
Brazil 3.7 
Cuba 3.7 
El Salvador 3.6 
Panama 3.6 
Colombia 3.5 
Peru 3.5 
Jamaica 3.3 
Guatemala 3.2 
Mexico 3.1 
Dominican Rep. 3.0 
Argentina 2.9 
Bolivia 2.8 
Guyana 2.7 
Ecuador 2.5 
Nicaragua 2.5 
Honduras 2.4 
Paraguay 2.2 
Haiti 2.2 
Venezuela 2.0 
 *Source: Transparency International. 
In the scale of 0-10. From 0-5, high levels of corruption 
Blue: More Transparent 
Pink: Borderline 
Orange: High Levels of Corruption 
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TABLE 4.  FDI INFLOWS IN LATIN AMERICA 2010* 
 
 
*Source: United Nations. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2010. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): Briefing Paper 2010. 
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Table 5.  Total Growth of Gross Domestic Product* 
(Millions of dollars in constant prices 2000)  
Variation rates  
Countries  2008  2009  2010
a
 2011
b 
 
Argentina  6.8  0.9  6.8  4.5  
Bolivia  6.1  3.4  4.5  4.0  
Brazil  5.1  ‐0.2  7.6  4.5  
Chile  3.7  ‐1.5  4.3  6.0  
Colombia  2.7  0.8  3.7  3.0  
Costa Rica  2.8  ‐1.1  4.0  3.0  
Cuba  4.1  1.4  1.9  3.0  
Ecuador  7.2  0.4  2.5  2.0  
El Salvador  2.4  ‐3.5  1.5  1.5  
Guatemala  3.3  0.6  2.0  3.0  
Haiti  0.8  2.9  ‐8.5  7.0  
Honduras  4.0  ‐1.9  2.5  2.0  
Mexico  1.5  ‐6.5  4.1  3.0  
Nicaragua  2.8  ‐1.5  2.0  2.0  
Panama  10.7  2.4  5.0  5.0  
Paraguay  5.8  ‐3.8  7.0  3.0  
Peru  9.8  0.9  6.7  4.5  
Dominican Republic  5.3  3.5  6.0  3.5  
Uruguay  8.5  2.9  7.0  4.0  
Venezuela  4.8  ‐3.3  ‐3.0  2.5  
 
 Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). On Line: 
http://www.eclac.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/4/40264/cuadroPIB_EE_ingles.pdf. 
 Chart modified for the purposes of this study. 
a 
Estimate 
b
 projection  
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Table 6. LATIN AMERICA  AND THE CARIBBEAN: TRENDS IN SELECTED ECONOMIC 
INDICATORS, 1990-2009* 
Country Year Per 
Capita  
GDP (in 
2000 
dollars)  
Per 
Capita 
Income 
(in 
2000 
dollars)a 
Unemploy 
ment 
% 
Annual                                                    Annual average variations in the 
period 
Variation 
 in  
consumer                                                                                                       
price                                                                                                                    
Real   Urban 
Indexb            Period            Per capita     Per capita     Mean real            
minimum 
                                                      GDP              Incomea    remuneration          
wage    
Brazil 1990 
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
869.8 
1005.6 
1010.5 
1173.3 
1191.9 
3280.6 
3491.3 
3635.4 
4463.0 
4399.1 
4.3 
7.6 
11.7 
7.9 
8.1 
2101.3 
8.9 
12.5 
5.9 
4.3 
 
1990-
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
 
0.8 
1.2 
4.1 
-1.1 
 
0.7 
1.4 
4.5 
-1.4 
 
0.2 
-2.1 
2.1 
1.3 
 
3.1 
4.2 
3.9 
7.4 
Costa Rica 1990 
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
3123.1 
4078.2 
4049.3 
5206.4 
5084.3 
3034.9 
3734.3 
3961.9 
4857.5 
4687.8 
5.4 
6.2 
6.8 
4.8 
7.6 
27.3 
10.1 
9.7 
13.9 
4.0 
 
1990-
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
 
 
3.0 
0.8 
1.5 
-2.3 
 
2.3 
2.1 
2.0 
-3.5 
 
2.2 
4.1 
-2.0 
 7.7 
 
  1.1 
-0.6 
-1.3 
 4.0 
Mexico 1990 
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
 
5393.6 
6121.8 
6320.4 
7094.6 
6563.1 
 
5235.6 
6043.8 
6265.3 
7269.3 
6657.3 
2.7 
3.7 
3.9 
4.9 
6.7 
29.9 
12.3 
5.7 
6.5 
3.6 
 
1990-
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
 
 
1.4 
-0.5 
0.5 
-7.5 
 
1.6 
0.1 
0.6 
-8.4 
 
0.7 
1.9 
2.2 
0.6 
 
-4.1 
0.7 
-2.1 
-1.5 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic 
of) 
1990 
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
4737.6 
4631.5 
4276.5 
5773.5 
5493.2 
4431.4 
4112.9 
3999.0 
7298.5 
6149.5 
10.4 
15.0 
15.8 
7.3 
7.8 
36.5 
20.0 
31.2 
31.9 
26.9 
 
1990-
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
 
-0.3 
-10.5 
3.0 
-4.9 
 
-0.8 
-10.3 
9.0 
-15.7 
 
-3.9 
-11.0 
-4.5 
…. 
 
-0.8 
-5.4 
-6.4 
….. 
Cuba 1990 
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
3340.9 
2613.0 
2873.8 
4362.9 
4426.2 
… 
2695.0 
2889.2 
…. 
…. 
5.4 
6.3 
3.3 
1.6 
1.7 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
 
1990-
1999 
2002 
2008 
2009 
 
 
-2.7 
1.2 
4.1 
1.4 
 
 
… 
1.3 
… 
… 
 
 
-9.4 
 9.3 
 0.1 
 4.1 
 
… 
 5.3 
-1.6 
  1.2 
*Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC): Social Panorama of 
Latin America 2010. Statistical Appendix. Chart modified for the purposes of this study. 
aReal per capita gross national income. 
bSimple average of December-to December variations for each year. 
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Table 7. BRAZIL INFLATION 2000-2011* 
 
 
*Source Economic Watch.  
 
    
 
 
 
7.056
6.835
8.425
14.784
6.597
6.884
4.196
3.638
5.672
4.899
5.037 6.268
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
BRAZIL INFLATION (AVERAGE CONSUMER PRICE CHANGE %)
72 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. MEXICO INFLATION 2000-2011* 
 
 
*Source Economic Watch.  
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Table 9. COSTA RICA INFLATION 2000-2011* 
 
 
*Source Economic Watch.  
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Table 10. VENEZUELA INFLATION 2000-2011* 
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